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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW -1953

Survey of Ohio Law-1953
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
In the field of administrative procedure during the period surveyed, the
courts have dealt with a wide range of matters: those concerned with invoking the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of an administrative agency; problems of an agency's power to act in various areas; and, lastly, procedures on
appeal from a quasi-judicial decision of an administrative body.
Kent ProvsonCo. v. Peck' illustrates the fact that obtaining a hearing
before an administrative body may be frustrated by procedural requirements
as technical as those for which courts are sometimes criticized. Here the
taxpayer filed with the board of tax appeals and the tax commissioner
notices of appeal from a final determination by the tax commissioner. The
commissioner filed a motion to dismiss the appeal before the board of tax
appeals on the sole ground that the notice of appeal filed with the tax commissioner did not have attached thereto and incorporated by reference a
copy of the final determination sent by the tax commissioner to the taxpayer as required by Section 5717.02, Ohio Revised Code (Section 5611,
Ohio General Code) The board of tax appeals dismissed the appeal for
want of jurisdiction and the supreme court affirmed. Judge Middleton,
dissenting, emphasized the highly technical nature of the error, and that the
tax commissioner could have notified the taxpayer's counsel so ihat the
error could have been rejected within the statutory time limit. It would not
seem that the great aims of administrative law are preserved by denying a
citizen a hearing on such insubstantial grounds.
Several cases considered the scope of an administrative agency's authority
under the statute empowering the agency to act. Under Section 4921.10,
Ohio Revised Code (Section 614-87, Ohio General Code) the public utilities commission may for "good cause" "revoke, alter or amend" any certificate issued by the commission. In Dworkm, Inc. v. Pab. Utilitws Comm'n'
a motor carrier's certificate was suspended by the commission for 30 days
for violations of a criminal statute and the commission's rules. The court
held that the power to "revoke, alter or amend" includes the lesser authority
to suspend operations under a certificate. Furthermore, the court sustained
the board's ruling that suspension for "good cause" may be based upon a
violation of a criminal statute (overloading a truck) even though there had
been no criminal prosecution under the statute.
159 Ohio St. 84, 110 N.E.2d 776 (1953).
'159 Ohio St. 174, 111 N.E.2d 389 (1953).
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McGowen v. Shaff&r3 involved the question of whether a county board
of health had the power to license plumbers, to require permits for the installation of plumbing, and to charge fees for issuing such licenses and permits. The court found that whereas such powers were not directly granted in
the statutes establishing this board, they were to be implied from the general police powers granted to the board. The fees charged for inspecting
plumbing installations were particularly attacked, but the court found them
reasonable charges for defraying the expenses of the board in making the
inspections and therefore within the board's authority. If the collections
had exceeded the expenses of inspections said the court, the charging of
fees might then have ben ultra wres.
This issue of charging fees was also considered in Stubbs v.Mitchell,4
and there a county board of health was held to have exceeded its authority.
The board was empowered, said the court, to require all dogs in the county
to be immunized annually against rabies. But such authority, said the court,
did not give the board power to require a license fee of 50 cents for each
immunization certificate. The money collected was turned over to the
Humane Society to enforce the immunization regulation. The court thought
the fees here were in the nature of a tax for general operating expenses and
beyond the board's power.
The vexing problem of the scope of the court's authority on appeal
from an administrative agency was again considered by the supreme court in
Sorge v. Sutton.5 This case involved the dismissal of two police officers
from the force after a hearing before the Cleveland Civil Service Commission. Each officer appealed to the court of common pleas under Section
143.27 of the Ohio Revised Code (Section 486-17a, Ohio General Code),
and the court, after considering the appeals on questions of law alone,
affirmed. The court of appeals" reversed and remanded the matter on the
theory that the common pleas court should have heard the matters as trials
de novo. The supreme court disagreed, however, with the court of appeals.
An "appeal" under Section 143.27, Ohio Revised Code (Section 486-17a,
Ohio General Code) ' to the common pleas court contemplates only a review
'65 Ohio L. Abs. 138, 111 N.E.2d 615 (Summit Com. P1. 1953)
*65 Ohio L. Abs. 204, 114 N.E.2d 158 (Ohio App. 1952), appeal diem 158 Ohio
St. 245, 108 N.E.2d 281 (1952).
159 Ohio St. 574, 113 N.E.2d 10 (1953).
662 Ohio L. Abs. 506, 107 N.E.2d 352 (App. 1952)
' The pertinent part of the section permits an appeal by the employee from a dismissal by the "appointing authority" and the commission "
may affirm, disaffirm
or modify the judgment of the appointing authority, and the commission's decision
shall be final; provided, however, that in the case of a removal of a [policeman or
fireman] of a municipality an appeal be had from the decision of the municipal commission to the court of common pleas of the county in which such municipality is
situated to determine the sufficiency of the cause of removal."
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of proceedings before the commission as to their legality and regularity, and
to determine the sufficiency of the "cause of removal," and not a trial de
novo. The word "appeal" must be interpreted in the light of the language
of the statute, said the court. Here "appeal" means only that the court shall
review the record made before the commission to determine the sufficiency
of the evidence.8 The law in Ohio is in a.muddled state on the issue of
whether an appeal from an administrative agency to a court of law requires
a hearing de novo, or merely a review of the record. The rationale presented by the decision in this case is not helpful in clarifying the law on this
subject.
A second problem in appealing from an administrative agency's ruling
was considered in Corn v. Board of Lsquor Control.10 There the director of
liquor control had brought an action before the board'of liquor control to
suspend or revoke a permit. The board entered an order adverse to the
permit holder in this case, and also ruled against the permit holder on his
appeal from the director's refusal to review his permit. The permit holder
appealed from each order to common pleas court under Section 119.12,
Ohio Revised Code (Section 154-73, Ohio General Code) (Ohio Administrative Procedure Act) -The common pleas court reversed both orders
of the 'board. Thereupon the board and the members thereof, the department of liquor control and the director appealed to the court of appeals
which accepted the cause and reversed the court of common pleas. The
supreme court held the court of -appeals should have granted the permit
holder's motion to dismiss the appeals because none of the administrative
officers or agencies had statutory authority to appeal. The heart of the
supreme court's decision is that the administrative officers and agencies were
not properly before the common pleas court, therefore they cannot appeal
from that court's decision to the court of appeals. The court stated that
only a "party adversely affected 'by an order of an agency" can appeal to the
common pleas court under Section 119.12, Ohio Revised Code (Section
154-73, Ohio General Code), and an agency is not a "party" or "person"
within Section 119.01, Ohio Revised Code (Section 154-62, Ohio General
'After the supreme court reversed the holding of the court of appeals on the trial
de novo issue, the court of appeals reviewed the record in the case and sustained the
common pleas court. Kelch v. Sutton, 114 N.E.2d 62 (Ohio App. 1953); accord,
Shillat v. Cleveland, 113 N.E.2d 267 (Ohio App. 1953).
'For a discussion of this problem under 5 119.12, Ohio Revised Code (§ 154-73,

Ohio General Code) (Ohio Administrative Procedure Act) see Note, State Admwstratwe Procedre-Scopeof JudicAd Rewiew, 4 W'sT. Ris. L. Ray. 45 (1952).
See also, Board of Liquor Control v. Tancer, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 360, 107 N.E.2d 532
(Ohio App. 1951), reheawmg dened, March 24, 1952, appeadism 158 Ohio St.
128, 107 N.E.2d 127 (1952); Kearns v. Sherrill, 137 Ohio St. 468, 30 N.E.2d 805

(1940).
10160 Ohio St. 9, 113 N.E.2d 360 (1953).
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Code). The court did not think it persuasive that the same section provides
that the hearing in the court of common pleas "shall proceed as in the trial
of a civil action" and the court's order shall be final "unless reversed, vacated or modified on appeal." In effect, the court is saying because only
the non-governmental litigant can appeal from an agency's ruling, the
hearing in the common pleas court must be without representation on the
part of the agency. It seems that the court is not recognizing the fact that
one department of an agency may appear as a litigant before another department of the same agency which hears the matter as a separate and distinct department sitting as a quasi-judicial body. This appears to be the
situation here: the director of liquor control was a litigant before the board
of liquor control. The director certainly should be a party before the common pleas court, and should have the right of appeal from that court's decision if an adequate body of law is to be constructed for the agency to administer. The decision in this case insofar as it prevents the director from
appearing in court on appeal seems contrary to the whole scheme of the
Administrative Procedure Act. In view of the supreme court decision, the
2
legislature must act by amending the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act'
to permit adequate representation by administrative agencies of issues before the courts on appeals from quasi-judicial decisions.
As long as some adversary party representing the public interest, whether
he be from a department of the agency involved, or from some other area,
appears in the court hearing on appeal it would not seem important that
the administrative board deciding the case is itself represented. In a case43
involving this issue, a township board of zoning appeals attempted to appeal
from a common pleas court decision reversing the board's ruling. The supreme court again dismissed the appeal on the ground that the board itself
had no statutory authority to appeal. (The Administrative Procedure Act
did not apply.) The court thought that the board's position, and the public
interest, could be adequately represented on appeal by "the administrative
officer, from whose decision an appeal to the board is authorized by statute,
" This analysis was accepted by a court of appeals which had held contrary to the
decision in the Corn case. Barn Cafe & Restaurant v. Board of Liquor Control, 63
Ohio L. Abs. 348, 107 N.E.2d 631 (Ohio App. 1952)
"The court in the Corn case cites some examples of administrative officers who are
specifically given by statute the right to appeal from rulings of specified agencies
and be heard in court, e.g., the administrator of the bureau of unemployment compensation; the tax commissioner.
"A. Di Cillo & Sons, Inc. v. Chester Zoning Board of Appeals, 158 Ohio St. 302,
109 N.E.2d 8 (1952)
" For a case in which the court of common pleas took the rather extraordinary step
of holding members of the board of liquor control in contempt of court for refusing
to comply with the court's order see Socotch v. Board of Liquor Control, 51 Ohio Op.
106, 114 N.E.2d 114 (Franklin Coin. P1. 1953)

